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External reach 
The research question behind this book is whether and to what extent the internal 
achievements of the EU can be transferred to external application. The contributions carry a 
message – that the standards, codes and contracts the EU is producing – or that are 
produced in the EU ‒ to extend and strengthen the external reach of EU law have at least the 
potential to turn the world into a ‘better place’. Most of the authors are from inside the EU, 
have studied law in one of the Member States, and have been working with EU law for 
decades. Implicitly or explicitly they seem to start from the premise that the European 
integration project is defensible and that the external reach of European law, whether 
legitimate or not, whether within or beyond its competences, is not as such negative. They 
believe in the potential of the EU as an alternative model for a better, more social market 
and a more just society, thereby not saving on criticism. The supporters of the European 
integration project are not per se sceptical or critical of what Anu Bradford calls the ‘Brussels 
effect’.2 She views the global reach of EU law as a contingent preference for high standards 
internally. It is said to occur when nondivisibility of standards happens to arise largely 
outside of the hands of the EU, be it economic, legal or technical indivisibility. The research 
question that guides this book project differs in that the focus is laid on the export of 
genuine European values. In Europe and between European legal scholars, there is sympathy 
and intellectual support for an EU that promotes higher standards of health and safety, data 
privacy, environmental standards, sustainability, and consumer protection and that sets 
better procedural safeguards through broader participation of affected parties, a more 
developed accountability and transparency and promotion of institutional patterns of 
judicial review instead of arbitration. 3 
Such sympathy rests on a couple of premises that more stringent standards are better in 
reality, the procedural requirements more inclusive and the institutional safeguards more 
democratic. How to provide evidence for such a claim? Transnational law is full of standards, 
codes and contracts. In order to be able to make an assessment of ‘better’ and ‘more’, one 
needs first to study the law in the books and then the law in action. This is what these 
contributions have been doing, not least due to the insights the authors have gained over 
years of research. The search for the law in action is particularly difficult as it requires 
empirical research and access to documents which are usually in the hands of companies 
and subject to business secrets as well as access to non-governmental organisations, 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank in particular Joanne Scott for thoughtful feedback, as well as Lucila de Almeida, Marta 
Cantero Gamito, Teemu Juutilainen, Rodrigo Vallejo and the participants of the faculty seminar at the EUI on 15 
May 2019 for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 Anu Bradford.’The Brussels Effect’, Northwestern University Law Review 107 (2012), 1. 
3 See ECJ Opinion 1/17 ECLI:EU:C:2019:341 which will have a bearing on the future of arbitration in the 
European legal order. 
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national and supranational bodies which are meant to supervise and monitor enforcement 
of standards, codes and contracts. The series of contributions discloses the difficulty in 
selecting the ‘correct’ set of rules let alone in finding evidence for their practical importance 
in remote parts of the world.  
However, even if the information made available suffices to assess the law in the books and 
the law in action, what is the yardstick against which it can be judged that standards, codes 
and contracts are better, fairer, more inclusive and more democratic – than what? What is 
the comparator and who decides on the comparator? More implicit than explicit, the 
contributions are engaged in a dialogue between the EU and the United States. This 
becomes clear mainly and mostly through the references which are used to discuss the 
different topics dealt with in the book. No word on China, India, Russia, no word on the 
revitalized discussion of the rich Global North against the poor Global South. There is an 
implicit assumption that higher health and safety standards, more stringent emission 
standards, and broader participation might produce better results, and mean increased 
justice for peoples – wherever they are living. Such an assumption requires not only a 
‘before’ and ‘after’ but also evidence of the impact of EU rules and procedures on non-EU 
societies and non-EU economies. This is the kind of counter argument Bradford faces with 
regard to the Brussels effect. How can we speak about the Brussels effect without having a 
methodology that allows us to test the effects of European rules?4 Again, even if such 
evidence of impact could be provided based on a sound methodology, if it could be shown 
that for example higher standards of food safety are better for the health of peoples and 
that American citizens benefit from the more stringent EU rules on health, safety, consumer 
and environmental protection, is it for the EU to decide what is good for all those who are 
not living within the territory of the EU?  
Is the EU the ‘gentle civiliser’ in the meaning of Martti Koskenniemi,5 or is the EU 
‘uncivilising’ third countries, be it through excessive consumption patterns, the harmful 
activities of EU corporations, or the export of hazardous waste that poses a threat to human 
health and the environment abroad? Does the gentle civiliser know not only what is good for 
EU citizens but also what is good for the world? This comes close to a new form of 
colonialism and imperialism,6 exercised and performed through the EU itself, through EU 
private bodies such as CEN and CENELEC with a public mandate and even through private 
regulators based in the EU but engaged in the promotion of higher, better, more just 
standards through codes and contracts?7 The Treaty provides the EU with a mandate to 
promote EU values beyond EU borders. Articles 21 and 3 (5) TEU set a high benchmark for 
the values to be realised in EU external economic relations.8 Article 21 (2) h) requires the EU 
to ‘promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
                                                          
4 Mathias Siems and Urška Šadl  raised these types of questions when Anu Bradford presented her book at the 
EUI in Florence on 8 April 2019. For a detailed analysis of the Brussels effect in competition law, G Monti, ‘The 
Global Reach of EU Competition Law’ in M Cremona/J Scott (eds) EU Law Beyond EU Borders The 
Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law, OUP 2019, 174. 
5 The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Hersch Lauterpacht 
Memorial Lectures, Band 14) 2010. 
6 I am aware of the sensitivity of the issue, but will leave the historical legacy and the normative dimension of 
the EU as gentle civilizer to a separate publication. 
7 See the contributions in the Special Section in the European Journal of International Law ‘Symposium: Global 
Public Good and the Plurality of Legal Orders, in F Cafaggi (ed), Vol 23 No 3, August 2012, 643‒792. 
8 V Kube, The EU's human rights obligations towards the wider world and the international investment regime, 
Making the promise enforceable, EUI phd 2018. 
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global governance’. In particular the plea for good governance triggered an inspiring debate 
on the relationship between the external dimension of EU law and private actors operating 
outside the EU but based in the EU.9 But is such an extension morally and ethically justifiable 
and legitimate? Anu Bradford binds the identified Brussels effect to five conditions: market 
size, regulatory capacity, stringent standards, inelastic targets and nondivisibility.10 Her 
major concern is the role and function of the EU as an empire which imposes its internal 
rules on the rest of the world, regardless of their quality and character. The EU, subject to 
compliance with these five conditions, is able to promote its own rules to the detriment of 
its key international regulatory competitors: the USA, China, and India. Bradford’s book not 
only explains the Brussels effect: it also carries a normative message. The EU puts other 
states at a competitive disadvantage, which is justified by the values the EU promotes. The 
‘higher’ and ‘better’ EU standards for a ‘more just’ society compete with other models of the 
economy and a society which rank non-economic values lower than the EU. All those who 
intend to participate in making the world a better place have to open an office in Brussels 
because it is Brussels where the action is.11  
Standards, codes and contracts are not at the forefront of academic research on the 
European law of external relations. Quite to the contrary: the intellectual discourse is clearly 
divided. On the one hand there is the established literature on EU law on external relations, 
which focuses on competences, on how ‒ and the degree to which ‒ the EU legislature, the 
European Commission and the ECJ are shaping the external relations of the EU, in security, in 
trade, in finance, in environmental protection, in labour and more recently in migration. 
Private law, although it cuts across these policy fields, stays outside the agenda and leads a 
separate life. In terms of the external dimension of private law, private international lawyers 
enter the field and throw 150 years of discourse into the scales. Visible European private 
law, what I term European regulatory private law and its external dimension, remains largely 
outside the blossoming debate on the external reach of European Union Law.12 When I read 
the recent book by Marise Cremona and Joanne Scott I felt as if there was a missing chapter 
– one on the external reach of European regulatory private law.13  
On the other hand there is an abundant literature on transnational law, on transnational 
private regulation, on global administrative law and on global constitutionalism. This is the 
area where technical standards, codes of practice and contracts are studied in great detail, 
through an ever-growing range of case studies.14 There is an astonishing gap in perspective. 
Transnational legal theorists refer to European private regulation as one form of 
transnational private regulation. European legal theorists on private regulation rely on 
transnational private regulation to build their arguments. The particularities of European 
                                                          
9 B van Vooren/ St Blockmans/Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance, The Legal Dimension, 
OUP 2013; A Marx/M Maertens/J Swinnen/J Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance, Economic, 
Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar 2012. 
10 Ch 9 of her upcoming book, on file with the author. 
11 D Vogel, Trading Up, Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, Harvard University Press 
1997. 
12 With few exceptions, H-W Micklitz/ M Cremona, Private Law in the External Dimension of the EU, OUP, 2016. 
13 M Cremona/J Scott (n 4). The book contains a chapter by P Davies on EU Financial Stability and the Global 
Influence of EU law, but no contribution deals with ERPL more generally. 
14 Ch Joerges/E-U Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade, Governance and International 
Economic Law, Hart Publishing 2011; in particular the collection in T C Halliday/G Shaffer (eds.) Transnational 
Legal Orders, CUP 2015; Sabino Cassese (ed) Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law, Edward Elgar 
2016.  
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private regulation remain somewhat under-researched. However, European private 
regulation takes place in a different regulatory environment, one which is more strongly 
entrenched by legal constraints beyond the nation state and beyond the EU legal order. The 
reason for the missing attention on the external reach of European private regulation might 
well be that private regulation does not start with the question who has the competence to 
do what, in what institutional frame, when and how. Private actors simply use freedom of 
contract beyond the nation state. They take action within the limits of bonos mores, 
reasonableness and good faith, whether individually or collectively and through whatever 
instruments of private ordering (USA) and private regulation (EU). They may develop a 
contractually defined institutional and procedural setting in which codes and standards are 
elaborated, or, rather, they may well instrumentalise contracts for the organisation of supply 
chains.  
In a European perspective Joanne Scott is bridging the gap between the two perspectives 
through her distinction between extraterritoriality, which is claimed to be rare, and 
territorial extension ‘where the EU uses the existence of a territorial connection with the EU 
(notably, but not only, market access) to influence conduct that takes place outside the 
EU.’15 The contributions to the book do not ‒ or only occasionally ‒ touch upon competence 
and extraterritoriality. They all fit into Scott’s category of ‘extraterritorial extension’ – 
through private regulation. Marta Cantero explained where the three categories – 
standards, codes and contracts – come from and why it makes sense to take a horizontal 
perspective.16 The variety of forms and functions is inherent to private autonomy. Private 
law does not set limits to the fantasies of private parties. Understanding standards, codes 
and contracts as a variation of extraterritorial extension allows us to locate research on the 
external dimension of European regulatory private law within the overall discussion of the 
global reach of EU law, more precisely of EU private regulatory law in its relation to 
transnational law.17  
The time we live in 
When handing in our book proposal to the publisher, we promised to identify the potential 
contribution of the EU, of EU private and economic law and EU legal theory to the debate on 
transnational law. This is not an easy undertaking in the current political and intellectual 
climate, in particular if the argument is that the EU and EU law have something ‘positive’ to 
offer and even to deliver. Defending the EU and defending European law, whether inside or 
outside the EU, necessarily invites the accusation of being at least naïve if not a disguised 
‘neoliberal’.18 Is it naïve to claim that European private regulation is promoting or may 
promote a good cause? Or is it a disguised neoliberal exercise, to focus on the external reach 
of private regulation, which rests in constitutional terms on market freedoms?19 Going back 
                                                          
15 J Scott, ‘The new EU Extraterritoriality’, CML Rev 51: 1343–1380, 2014 at 1344; same author, 
‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’, 62 AJCL (2014), 87–126. 
16 Introduction in this volume. 
17 The concept of European regulatory private law encompasses primary and secondary EU law as well as 
private regulation. Throughout the text I am using regulatory private law and private regulation 
interchangeably; see H-W Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Private Law ‒ The Transformation of 
European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’, in Yearbook of 
European Law 2009 (28), OUP 2010, 3‒60 
18 There is certainly more to say on the variations of neoliberalism, eg, W Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism, 
Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition, Sage 2014. 
19 The Treaties do not explicitly refer to private autonomy. This is claimed to be enshrined in the four market 
freedoms. For the first account ever, P- Ch Müller-Graf, ‘Privatrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht: 
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to the title of the epilogue, is it imaginable to understand private regulation as a mode of 
promoting a good cause – justice and human rights – or is private regulation structurally and 
necessarily a means of promoting market freedoms and of undermining national social 
justice and European human rights? This is not the place to refer to the difference between 
the European understanding of private regulation and the American understanding of 
private ordering.20 What matters, however, is the answer to the question whether the EU 
itself, EU-built private bodies or simply European associations and European companies are 
using standards, codes and contracts as a tool through which the ambitious objectives 
enshrined in Articles 21 and 3 (5) TEU are realized in practice or could be realized in the 
future. Or whether all these private activities are merely a means of undermining ambitious 
Treaty objectives, turning the EU into a hypocrite preaching human rights and social justice 
but actually practising economic freedoms?  
There is a growing tension between those who see the EU as a potential civilizer and those 
who understand the EU as a neoliberal hegemon. In order to illustrate the context in which 
the positioning takes place I would like to contrast Wolfgang Streeck, a forceful critic of the 
EU21 with Gráinne de Búrca, a supporter of the EU and its potential despite all its 
insufficiencies. In a recent interview with Spiked, Streeck characterized the EU with the 
following words.22  
Originally, the EU was an organisation for joint economic planning among six adjacent 
countries. The planning was sectorally specific, limited to coalmining and the steel industry, 
later also nuclear power, in the context of the state-managed capitalism of the postwar 
era. Then it grew into a free-trade zone, increasingly devoted to spreading neoliberal 
internationalism, in particular the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, 
under the rubric of the Internal Market.  
As the number and heterogeneity of member states continuously increased, ‘positive 
integration’ became ever-more difficult. Instead, there was ‘negative’ integration: the 
removal of substantive regulations that impeded free trade within the bloc. After the end 
of Communism in 1989, the EU became a geostrategic project, closely intertwined with the 
US’s geostrategy in relation to Russia. From the original six countries cooperating in the 
management of a few key sectors of their economies, the EU became a neoliberal empire 
of 28 highly heterogeneous states. The idea was and is to govern those states centrally by 
obliging them to refrain from state intervention in their economies… 
Streeck’s analysis condensed in an interview and necessarily somewhat catchy, but fully 
developed elsewhere, requires dismantling the EU, giving democratic control back to the 
people within the nation states and leaving any external extension to national legal orders, if 
any. In line with Streeck, a growing strand of literature is pointing to market bias and the 
market rationality of the EU that undermines national democracies and dismantles social 
justice.23 This strand of literature could be characterized as idealizing the good old welfare 
state and neglecting the social achievements of the EU. The devastating criticism does not 
leave room for understanding the EU as a promoter of justice inside or outside, through 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht’, in Staat und Wirtschaft in der EG (edited by Peter-Christian Müller-Graf/Manfred 
Zuleeg), Baden-Baden Nomos 1989, 17‒52 
20 Shaffer, Gregory C, ‘Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, Annual Review of Law and Social Science’, 2016, 
Forthcoming; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No 2016‒06. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2734318 
21 W Streeck, How will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System, Verso 2016. 
22 https://www.spiked-online.com/2019/03/29/the-eu-is-an-empire/ 
23 Contributions in Dimitry Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca, Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? Hart 
Publishing 2016. 
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legislation or through private regulation. In such a perspective, private regulation being 
understood as an opportunity to promote social values, human rights and democracy 
outside the EU legal orders looks like a fata morgana, far away from economic and political 
reality. 
At the other end of the spectrum are voices like that of de Búrca,24 a European legal scholar, 
now a professor at New York University. She identifies both the existing and potential role of 
the EU as a gentle civilizer. Her starting point is a quote from Martin Wolf in the Financial 
Times:25 
The principal political force is the commitment to the ideal of an integrated Europe, along 
with the huge investment of the elite in that project. This enormously important motivation 
is often underestimated by outsiders. While the Eurozone is not a country, it is much more 
than a currency union. Also for Germany, much the most important member, the Eurozone 
is the capstone of a process of integration with its neighbours that has helped bring stability 
and prosperity after the disasters of the first half of the 20th century. 
She then claims:26 
Wolf’s argument is that this underlying political commitment (what Weiler calls the 
messianic)27 is what fundamentally and most powerfully continues to drive the European 
integration process. He then elaborates further on the EU’s original mission of bringing 
peace and prosperity to the continent, asserting that ‘the big idea that brings the 
members [of the EU] together is that of their place within Europe and the world’. 
There are two important insights in this brief commentary. The first is the emphasis on the 
continued salience of the EU’s founding ideal, or mission. But the second is the reframing 
of the EU’s founding ideal (bringing a degree of peace and prosperity to the continent) in a 
way that emphasizes the external as well as the internal relevance of European 
integration. …I suggest that this dual-facing mission – the development of a novel 
transnational relationship between the Member States, their citizens and the EU on the 
one hand, and the development of the EU’s situation and role within the broader global 
context on the other, provides a better articulation of the EU’s raison d’être today… 
Is this overtly naïve and clandestinely supporting neoliberalism? Rodrigo Vallejo28 
characterizes the theoretical background behind the overall research project, the External 
Dimension of European Regulatory Private Law (ED-ERPL) as paradoxical, on the one hand 
studying and criticizing the ongoing transformations of private law, while on the other hand 
advocating its potential for the development of transnational law. Such an understanding 
does not follow the position invoked by Streeck. Quite to the contrary it contains a 
normative message. The idea of European Integration and European regulatory private law is 
regarded as providing for the potential to carry the internal European public good to the 
outside world. Hanoch Dagan29 and Martijn Hesselink30 have voiced strong resistance against 
the capacity of the EU to generate social values within the rationality of the Internal Market. 
                                                          
24 Gráinne De Burca, ‘Europe’s Raison d’être’ in Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds), The European 
Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (CUP 2013), 21. 
25 M Wolf, ‘Why the Eurozone May Yet Survive: Members Remain Absolutely Committed to the Idea of an 
Integrated Europe’, Financial Times, 17 April 2012. 
26 Gráinne De Burca, n 23, 21, 34‒36. 
27 Weiler, JHH ‘Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay’, in J 
Dickson and P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 137‒
158. 
28 In this volume. 
29 Dagan, H ‘Between Regulatory and Autonomy-Based Private Law’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 644‒658. 
30 Hesselink, M W ‘Private Law, Regulation and Justice’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 681‒695. 
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Therefore the external reach of socially-inspired European private regulation might be even 
more demanding. The claim is by and large in line with de Búrca. That is why her idealism 
would equally touch upon the said paradox of ED-ERPL. The only way out of Streeck’s 
criticism is to provide evidence for the claimed effects, theoretically and empirically. The 
current book on standards, codes and contracts is precisely meant to serve that very 
purpose. Whether this has been achieved or not is something I shall return to. 
The role of critical legal scholarship 
There is a second strand in Streeck’s critique of the EU, one which tackles the role and 
function of left wing intellectuals in the European integration process. Streeck is very much 
focusing on political science, but his critique can easily be transferred to the role and 
function of European legal scholarship. The revitalization of the ‘political economy of the 
law’31 entails a kind of self-inception on the role and function that critical legal scholarship 
played in the building of the EU. Studying European law and defending the EU is no longer 
self-explanatory. Swimming against the ever stronger tide of critical voices, also and in 
particular from left-wing scholars like Streeck, requires justification and disclosure of one’s 
position. On the question ‘Why has the left become so attached to the EU?’ Streeck answers: 
I wish I knew. Maybe because they confuse the EU with Europe? The EU is a deplorably 
undemocratic institutional construct that is so complex that you cannot understand how 
it works without extensive investigation – and even then you may not quite grasp what 
it is about. This means that you can read almost anything into it. You can identify it with 
personal dreams of a world that is free from historical burdens. Or you can see it as the 
embodiment of a pleasant consumerist lifestyle: rights without obligations, free travel, 
no taxes, immigrant labour, an international labour market for English-speaking 
university graduates. ‘Europe’ is your oyster: a playground for the new middle-class, the 
bobos, as the French call them: the bourgeois bohemians, the self-appointed 
cosmopolitans who believe that by importing cheap labour for their households they are 
doing something for the progress of mankind. 
In 1944 Friedrich von Hayek accused left wing intellectuals of being complicit in socialism;32 
in 2019 Streeck accuses left wing intellectuals of being complicit in capitalism. The rightist 
Hayek and the leftist Streeck are united in their critique. Hayek criticised the sympathy of 
leftist intellectuals for grand ideas whilst undermining those grand ideals in daily practice. 
For his part, Streeck joins forces with Michel Houellebecq33 in his criticism of the behaviour 
of intellectuals, in practice betraying their ideas and ideologies. I am taking sides neither 
with Hayek nor with Streeck.34 I do sympathize with Milosz’ The Captive Mind and his 
distinction between four types of intellectuals in Stalinist times: Alpha the Moralist, Beta the 
Disappointed Lover, Gamma, the Slave of History, and Delta the Troubadour.35  
Each of the four shows astonishing similarities to the current behaviour of critical legal 
scholars in times of crisis.36 Alpha is still searching for the new individual that could replace 
                                                          
31 David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski and Jedediah Purdy, ‘Law and Political Economy: Toward a Manifesto’, 
6.11.2017 https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/06/law-and-political-economy-toward-a-manifesto/ and P Kjaer (ed) 
The Law of Political Economy - Transformations in the Functions of Law, forthcoming Hart Publishing 2019. 
32 Friedrich v Hayek, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, University of Chicago Law Review 1949 (16), 417, 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol16/iss3/7 
33 Soumission, Flammarion 2015. 
34 It is worth looking into the book review by A Tooze, ‘A General Logic of Crisis, Review of W. Streeck, How will 
capitalism end’, London Review of Books, Vol 39 No 1,  5 January 2017, 3‒8, which might prompt reflection on 
who is cynical: the leftists themselves or those who criticize the leftists. 
35 Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind, (London: Penguin Books, [1953] 1980). 
36 For deeper analysis H-W Micklitz, ‘The Transformative Politics of European Private Law’, in Kjaer (n 30). 
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the Kantian ideal. This kind of thinking exists in neo-Marxist theories. Beta is demoralised, 
turning love into disappointment, while facing cynicism and self-destruction. European legal 
scholarship is full of betas. Gamma is still pursuing the once set political objective against all 
resistance and sometimes even against her own convictions. This attitude is dominant in the 
day-to-day business of doctrinal European legal scholarship and court practice.37 Streeck 
would have to classify this kind of research as naïve as it promotes a neoliberal agenda 
without critical self-reflection. Delta is the opportunist, defending and criticising the EU at 
the same time. Many critical legal scholars will share Delta’s bias. Are these the ‘bobos’? 
What about Streeck and de Búrca and the lines of scholarship they present? How to classify 
them? I will leave it for the critical legal scholars themselves to reflect on where they stand. I 
would put myself into the category of Delta, perhaps with a touch of Gamma, in sympathy 
with J. Baquero Cruz’38 reading of EU Law’s legacy as the ‘Law After Auschwitz’, where he 
insists on the historical roots of the European integration project.  
The revival of the political economy offers the opportunity not only to reflect on the role of 
intellectuals but to put the whole integration process and the role of the key actors at the 
European and the national level to an acid test.39 Such an ideological critique (Ideologiekritik) 
might disclose uncomfortable truths, on the complicity of the Member States with the EU, 
on instrumentalizing the European level playing field to support decisions for which national 
governments in power could not find the necessary support in their home countries. 
Remember the Lisbon Agenda 2000 with its bombastic rhetoric of ‘making the EU the most 
competitive economy in the world’ and of replacing justice through the binary code of 
inclusion vs. exclusion.40 Biased politics is everywhere apparent in dismantling the EU as a 
neoliberal hegemon and in idealising the golden age of the European welfare state. What is 
all too often lacking is a thorough look into the second limb of the political economy of law. 
Economics requires an impartial stock-taking of the costs of the welfare state, of the link 
between the sovereign debt crisis and the welfare state, not least of the ‘who paid and who 
pays’ for social benefits. Empirical research has blatantly proved the forceful formula of 
David Caplovitz, as epitomised in the title of his book The Poor Pay More.41 The ‘poor’ are 
paying for the social achievements for the benefit of the ‘haves’ – bourgeois intellectuals.42 
But even the political economy of EU law suffers from an inward-looking perspective.  
What does ideological critique mean for the external dimension of EU law and more 
particularly of European regulatory private law? Unanswered questions abound at both the 
political and the economic level. At the political level the question arises whether the EU 
despite all its internal deficiencies is still able to give its external relations a promising 
outlook. This could mean that non-statutory actors, private bodies and institutions are able 
to produce values that are in line with the ambitious Treaty objectives. Are private parties 
supposed to compensate for the deficits of public actors or are private parties the only 
                                                          
37 Textbooks on European law and contributions in European law journals, such as the Common Market Law 
Review, the European Law Review, and the Yearbook of European Law. 
38 Julio Baquero Cruz, What's Left of the Law of Integration? Decay and Resistance in European Union Law (OUP 
2018). 
39 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 
814. 
40 Guido Comparato,The Financialisation of the Citizen, Hart Publishing 2018. 
41 The Poor Pay More, Free Press 1967. 
42 Smith, TB, France in Crisis. Welfare, Inequality, and Globalization since 1980 (Cambridge; New York: CUP, 
2004); Smith, TB, La France injuste. 1975-2006. Pourquoi le modèle social français ne fonctionne plus (Paris: 
Autrement, 2006). 
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potential actors who could promote ‘the Social’ beyond the nation state, at least within the 
scope of private law? At the economic level the question is what kind of effects are good and 
promising rules producing in countries that are not as strong as the United States and that 
are not able to cope with the Brussels effect. Raising standards on product safety, labour, 
consumer and environmental protection raises the access costs to the Internal Market to a 
degree which might be prohibitive. Neither EU law nor WTO law foresees the possibility of 
double standards on the Social to the benefit of the Global South.43 These countries may 
produce more cheaply because of lack of appropriate standards in labour law, in health and 
safety at work, in consumer and environmental protection law in their home countries, but 
the products they produce and the services they deliver have to comply with ‘higher’ and 
‘better’ EU standards. If the EU extends its values through private regulation to the Global 
South, the poorest of the poor might simply not be able to cope with the requirements, 
politically and economically. They might then lose their economic advantage which results 
from neglect of the values the EU aims to promote through the Treaty of Lisbon. This is 
another – unwanted ‒ dimension of the Brussels effect.44 
Efforts to overcome the democratic deficit and to save ‘the Social’ might at the very best 
help to maintain the EU as an attractive model with its unique combination of market 
integration and social regulation. My protagonist for the EU, Streeck, who understands the 
EU as a neoliberal hegemon, does not acknowledge such an opportunity: 
The EU’s de facto constitution consists of the Treaty of European Union, which is 
practically impossible to revise, and the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, which only the court itself can revise. The neoliberal core of the EU as an institution 
and the results of European integration were intended by its framers to be eternal and 
irreversible. This is shown by the hard opposition in Brussels to a British exit, and in the 
intention to make that exit as unpleasant as possible.  
It is also, and perhaps more importantly, visible in the inability of EU institutions to 
respond constructively to claims for more national autonomy, as expressed by various 
‘populist’ countermovements. These movements are now blocking the process of 
European integration and there is a large risk that the insistence of Berlin, Paris and 
Brussels on prolonging and extending the established European institutions will lead to 
serious conflict between European nations, such as we have not seen since 1945. 
Whereas the political direction of the impact seems to be rather clear, the economic 
implications remain more opaque. Does the return to the nation state, to national 
democracies, imply a revival of national economics? The ‘my country first’ rhetoric is gaining 
ground around the globe and triggering trade conflicts between China and the USA or 
between the EU and the USA. If free trade is affected so will private regulation and 
opportunities to realise the objectives of Articles 21 and 3 (5) TEU. Again, another voice is 
expressing a more optimistic outlook on Europe’s future and the transformability of the EU. 
Critical scholars from all over Europe have started a ground-level initiative over the internet 
gathering support for democratization of the Treaty through a European assembly which 
strengthens the role of the nation states and advocates a European tax that serves to re-
establish solidarity between the peoples of the EU:45  
                                                          
43 For an early discussion of the mismatch between internal rules and the implications for the rest of the world, 
H-W Micklitz, Technische Normen, Produzentenhaftung und EWG-Vertrag, NJW, 1983, 483‒489, at 489. 
44 A Bradford is currently undertaking research on the impact of the Brussels effect on the Global South, 
Statement during her presentation at the EUI on 8 April 2019. 
45 http://tdem.eu/en/manifesto/ 
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We, European citizens, from different backgrounds and countries, are today launching this 
appeal for the in-depth transformation of the European institutions and policies. This 
Manifesto contains concrete proposals, in particular a project for a Democratization Treaty 
and a Budget Project which can be adopted and applied as it stands by the countries who so 
wish, with no single country being able to block those who want to advance. It can be 
signed on-line (www.tdem.eu) by all European citizens who identify with it. It can be 
amended and improved by any political movement. 
At the time of writing it is by no means clear in which direction the EU will move after Brexit, 
whether there will be a window for reform or not and if there is a window what the direction 
will be. The painful process of the Brexit negotiations has suffocated voices in other Member 
States to leave the EU following the UK example – for now. Those who might interpret this 
outcome as a success should not overlook that this account is the result of a power play, in 
which the EU is behaving like an economic and political hegemon. The EU has brought the 
United Kingdom to its knees. This sounds more like Gamma the slave of history than like 
Delta the Troubadour. For the future of the two together, these are hardly promising 
prospects. The cracks in the international economic order are much clearer and much more 
visible. The USA and the EU are engaging in ever more bilateral trade agreements, 
occasionally in regional trade agreements; industry is transforming trade relations into 
global value chains.46 Whether the post Second World War order will survive the ‘my 
country first rhetoric’, the rise of bilateral and regional agreements as well as global value 
chains remains to be seen. Maybe what we can observe is already the awakening of a new 
fragmented international economic order. What does this all mean for the external 
dimension of standards, codes and contracts? 
With regard to the current state of affairs of European regulatory private law within the EU, I 
have tried to show that the EU is more than just a neoliberal hegemon. The rise of consumer 
law, within limits employment law, and more particularly non-discrimination law 
demonstrates that the EU has been able to generate a genuine understanding of ‘the Social’. 
I have made four claims:47 firstly, that the European Union legal order is not limited to 
market rationality alone. It has yielded a genuine pattern of justice, what I have termed 
access justice. Secondly, the Social is characteristic of the EU and the Member States as they 
stand today. In the transnational society that the EU is about to build, where the grip of 
public power is weakened, the market intermingles with society. Therefore a new form of 
justice can be identified – societal justice. Thirdly, the EU is the laboratory where the 
adaptation processes of an economic order occur, an order that that merges market 
rationality, access justice and societal justice in a globalised world, intermingling substantive, 
procedural and institutional elements of governance.48 Fourthly, the responsibility for 
European experimentalism lies jointly with the EU, the Member States and private parties. In 
European private law beyond the nation state, business turns into the addressee of social 
responsibility, but also private parties, provided they have the capabilities, bear a 
responsibility for building a transnational European market society.49 Whilst underdeveloped 
and certainly not yet mainstream, EU law allows for transforming political responsibility into 
                                                          
46 R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). 
47 H-W Micklitz, The Politics of Justice in European Private Law, CUP, 2018. 
48 Ibid at 30 on the different levels of governance with regard to the external dimension; R Vallejo in this 
volume also on the external dimension. 
49 Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman, ‘Just Relationships’ (2016), 116(6) Columbia Law Review, 1395‒1460; 
Hanoch Dagan/Michael Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts, CUP 2017. 
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the legal responsibility of private parties, in particular of private companies and private 
regulators, at least within the EU.50 
The ED-ERPL project is meant inter alia to test these findings in the relationship between the 
EU and the outside world. Is it possible to transfer the achievements of the inner EU to its 
external relations? In foro interno in foro externo – to paraphrase the famous article by 
Pierre Pescatore?51 My defence of the European Social Model is mostly based on secondary 
EU law: labour law, consumer law, non-discrimination law, the law the EU has adopted 
within its given competences, and how European private law has transformed national laws, 
thereby generating access justice and societal justice, standing side by side with national 
patterns of social justice. Analysing the external dimension of European private law would 
therefore require a look into extraterritoriality and the external reach of EU labour law, 
consumer law and non-discrimination law. Indeed, the ED-ERPL project is investigating the 
impact of EU consumer law on national legal systems in Africa, in Asia and in South America. 
It would go beyond the purpose of an epilogue to report on the findings.52 
Seen through the theoretical framework of the ED-ERPL, the current book and its 
contributions provides insights into how private parties are using the increased liberties to 
shape the relationship b2b and b2c, whether there is evidence for external reach and 
whether it is possible to trace elements of justice in standards, codes and contracts. In 
theory, societal justice would have to play a prominent role in an economic environment 
where binding EU rules lose importance and where compliance with the inner standards of 
EU private law becomes discretionary.  
The place for standards, codes and contracts 
In the light of the foregoing – what, then, is the role of the EU, EU bodies and EU institutions, 
of European companies and European NGOs in the field of standards, codes and contracts? 
Is it possible and feasible on the basis of the contributions to this book to give an answer, 
however tentative it might be, as to whether the EU is the grand civilizer in helping to 
establish a transnational society or merely a neoliberal hegemon in disguise using private 
regulation as a means of extending the internal market rationale? I will break down my 
considerations into three different aspects: access and expertise; private, public and semi-
private actors in private regulation; and evaluation of ‘better’ rhetoric. I will conclude with 
an outlook on the tension between reality and potentiality. 
Access to the research field and expertise in the research field – practice and theory 
Studying private regulation in whatever area immediately provokes the question how to gain 
access to the information needed. Access to information is all too often equated with gaining 
access to a club.53 As long as the study object results from a collective exercise, from 
                                                          
50 Azoulai, L ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the 
Conditions for its Realisation’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 1335‒1355. 
51 P Pescatore, ‘External Relations in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, CML 
Rev 16 (1979) 615. 
52 On Africa see the contributions in the special issue of the Journal of Consumer Law 2018. Asian consumer law 
and its interaction with the EU is part of a book edited by M Durovic/G Howells/A Janssen/H-W Micklitz, 
Consumer Protection in Asia: Past, Present and Future, to be published in 2020 with CUP. South American 
consumer law will be published in a special issue of the Journal of Consumer Law in 2020 under the joint 
responsibility of Cl Lima Marques and Hans-W Micklitz. 
53 R van Gestel/H-W Micklitz, ‘European Integration through Standardisation: How Judicial Review is breaking 
down the Club House of Private Standardisation Bodies’, CML Rev 2013 (50), 145‒182. 
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business associations in the broadest sense, access is relatively easy. Nowadays, most  
information is available on the Internet. This changes when the study object is related to one 
company, for example to the contract a particular company is using to organize its supply 
chains. Even if this hurdle can be overcome the difficulty remains as to how to assess the 
practical impact of standards, codes and contracts. Typically, research on private regulation 
relies on qualitative methods, in the end on interviews with shareholders and stakeholders 
in the field. To conduct quantitative research on the whole sector requires considerable 
research funds. In a perfect world, each complements the other. But the question remains of 
the politics behind empirical research.54 
Clearly, the contributors managed to obtain access to information and access to the club. 
Most of the factual analysis provides results from insider knowledge gained through 
qualitative interviews or from being a member of the club, or both. The empirical researcher 
has to navigate their project between the Scylla of no access means no information and the 
Charybdis of receiving access at the price of membership means losing independence. I do 
not want to be misunderstood. I have found myself all too often squeezed between bad 
choices and I know how difficult it is to resist the promising temptation of being accepted 
into the club. The risk of biased empirical research is the stronger, the narrower the field and 
the more limited the number of actors. Where is the remedy? I would propose going back to 
Milosz and the four types of intellectuals again.  
A considerable degree of expertise is needed in order to be able to understand the rationale 
of the respective market, sector or rules. There is certainly a need to clarify what an expert is 
and what expertise means.55 Luhmann’s finding of the ever-more-fragmented society is 
equally reflected in the sectorisation of markets, what Cantero calls verticalisation,56 not 
only with regard to the three forms of private regulation here under scrutiny but also within 
its study object. Technical standards in the production of cars cannot be so easily compared 
to technical standards in the field of banking and finance. Codes of practice are sector-
related and contracts even ‒ if used to organize supply chains ‒ demonstrate a high degree 
of diversity. Each of the contributors is an expert in the field they are studying, sometimes 
for years building their own contact network which guarantees access and which allows 
them to generate informal knowledge. I will certainly not claim to be a more knowledgeable 
expert. Therefore, I will not comment on the substance of the findings. In what follows I take 
the analysis for granted. 
Relating the overall question of the role of the EU and of EU law to the different 
contributions, one observation springs to mind: the key role of empirics. The findings more 
often than not allow for a well-grounded answer. Empirics is like a drug. Once you start 
studying the reality of private regulation (in our case), you easily realise that you need to 
know more, more about the substance – the content and the inherent values ‒ more about 
the procedure – who is actually participating in rule-making and with what intentions ‒ more 
on the institutional setting – how bodies and associations are interacting with transnational 
and national actors and under what rules and conditions. The list of ‘more’ could easily be 
extended. Many of the contributions even point to the need for more research in order to be 
                                                          
54 H-W Micklitz/A Villanueva, ‘Refit or Rethink: The Politics of Research in the EU’, to be published in E van 
Schagen/St Weatherill (eds), Hart Publishing, 2019. 
55 E Korkea-Aho/P Leino organized a workshop on expertise and experts in Helsinki in June 2018. The 
contributions will be published as ‘The Politics of Legal Expertise’ in 2020. 
56 M Cantero in this volume. 
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able to answer the guiding question. The ‘more’, however, is structurally inbuilt. There is 
never enough ‘more’.  
The therapy for terminating the dependency of empirics is to go back to theory. Vallejo57 
proposes understanding ongoing developments in private regulation as being part of the 
merger between the public and the private, between the internalities and the externalities 
of the EU, between the vertical and the horizontal, what he terms ‘private administrative 
law’. The concept of private administrative law allows for putting private regulation under a 
single theoretical and conceptual umbrella. Seeing the contributions to the book in this way 
may very well inspire the ‘idea of private administrative law’. That is why it is intellectually 
more (sic) rewarding to draw conclusions on the basis of information which has been 
delivered.  
Private, public and semi-private actors  
The variety of actors is characteristic of the field of transnational private regulation. The 
contributions cover the role and function of the European Union/European Commission in 
energy58, finance59, online platforms60, supply chains61 and arbitration,62 the role and 
function of semi-public bodies such as European63 and international standards bodies64 and 
the role and function of private associations and companies in the food sector65 and in the 
organisation of the internet.66  
The first question that arises is whether a link exists between the degree of 
publicness/privateness and promotion of the public good.67 As the saga goes, one might 
assume that promotion of the public good is the stronger the ‘more’ public the key actors 
are. If we include nation states on the side of public actors, then the decline of the public 
good would go hand in hand with the change of the level playing field, from nation state, to 
the EU to international bodies. The public good is suggested to be the better protected the 
closer the grip at the national state level on private actors; conversely, the public good is the 
lesser respected the stronger the influence of private actors within or outside a binding 
transnational frame. The overall consequence is abundantly clear: the public good can best 
be protected at the nation-state level; whether the EU is able to protect the public good 
throws us back to the diametrically opposite assessments of Streeck vs de Búrca. In contrast 
to the international level, the EU disposes of a legal order, of law-making institutions, 
enforcement authorities and an independent court. In theory the European legal order 
should be better suited to carrying the public good than the international legal order.  
Is this correct? The contributions seem to tell a differentiated story. There are areas where 
public bodies do not play a role or, if any, a role in backing the activities of private actors, 
such as ICANN, in the development of CSR in the Dutch banking sector or in the 
                                                          
57 R Vallejo in this volume and the same, ‘After Governance. The Idea of Private Administrative Law’ in Kjaer (n 
30). 
58 L de Almeida in this volume. 
59 T Juutilainen, A Marcacci and K Pijl in this volume. 
60 Ch Busch in this volume. 
61 M de la Cuesta in this volume. 
62 B Warwas in this volume. 
63 R van Gestel/P van Lochem in this volume. 
64 M Mataija in this volume.  
65 P Verbruggen in this volume. 
66 G Spindler in this volume.  
67 For the sake of argument I equate public good with Arts 21 and 3 (5) TEU. 
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management of transnational food safety. There are equally semi-public bodies like 
CEN/CENELEC and ISO/IEC whose standard-setting activities form part and parcel of a 
European respectively an international framework.68 Within that regulatory framework 
product safety is deeply embedded and forms an integral part of private regulation. Finance 
tells a very particular story. The European Commission is participating in IOSCO. However, its 
role does not seem to be to promote investor protection and social rights. Quite the 
opposite, the European Commission is using the international level playing field to liberalise 
the European capital market.69  
The second issue that deserves attention is how the different actors are using EU law. It 
seems as if all European actors are united in one single objective – to use private regulation 
as a means through which the reach of EU law can be extended. This is particularly evident in 
the contributions by Paul Verbruggen on food safety, Barbara Warwas on the promotion of 
arbitration as a means of stretching EU law beyond its boundaries,70 Lucila de Almeida on 
the integration of EU mandatory standards into energy contracts and María Paz de la Cuesta 
on the promotion of fair trading in supply chains. Whilst private regulation pursues mostly 
concrete policy-related objectives such as safety or fairness, the situation is different with 
regard to the role and function of what has become famous under the notion of the ‘new 
approach’. The EU regulatory framework, in its interplay of a binding legal framework which 
empowers private standard bodies to translate broad policy aims into concrete standards, 
inspired the WTO/TBS agreement.71 Here it is not a particular field of EU law but the overall 
European institutional framework that inspired the making of international law. It has to be 
recalled that the philosophy behind the ‘new approach’ inspired the design of the Single 
European Act. A kind of constitutional dimension is hidden in the new approach. The ‘law on 
standards’72 covers what I have termed societal justice. The key role of private actors comes 
at a price. They become the holders of responsibilities towards the public. The opening 
towards society, even if rather limited, is documented in the integration of civil society 
organisations in the elaboration of such standards. 
The three recent judgments of the ECJ in the field of technical standards – Frabo, Elliott and 
Schmidt73 ‒ demonstrate the preparedness of the ECJ to submit European technical 
standards to a thoroughly restricted judicial review. Details do not matter. It is the simple 
fact that counts. The ECJ seized the first opportunity to open up a new chapter in the 
relationship between voluntary non-binding technical standards and the legal order. The few 
decisions do not yet allow discovery of a clear line of argument, but the message of the ECJ 
to private regulators is clear.74 We, the court, are ready to take a closer look at what you are 
                                                          
68 Lucila de Almeida, Marta Cantero Gamito and Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Institutional and Normative Cooperation in 
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MIT Press 2016; H-W Micklitz, Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht, Nomos Baden-Baden, 1994, 267. 
72 H Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005); same author, ‘The 
Empire’s Drains, Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardisation under the TBT Agreement’, in Ch 
Joerges/E-U Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade, Governance and International Economic 
Law, 2 edn, Hart Publishing 2011, 397; P. Vallejo under II.4. in this volume. 
73 ECJ Case C-171/11, Fra.bo [2012] ECR I-000; Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction [2016] ECR I-000; Case 
C-219/15, Schmitt [2017] ECR I-000. 
74 P Delimatsis (ed), The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardisation, CUP 2015. 
15 
 
doing within your standards bodies, if not in substance then at least in terms of procedural 
requirements and the broader institutional framing in which private standard-setting 
operates. This case-law, if hardened, will certainly not remain without impact beyond EU 
territory. 
The ‘better’ rhetoric  
The most difficult question to answer is certainly whether and to what extent the extension 
of private regulation beyond European territory is for the ‘good’ or for the ‘bad’. To 
paraphrase what Mark Freedland75 said about the relationship between the EU and the UK 
with regard to the ‘Social’ – are the standards, codes and contracts that govern economic 
transactions around the globe a bit more social due to the European legacy on the 
importance of the Social for a market economy or is the EU dismantling the social legacy by 
changing the level playing field from the European to the transnational, using the 
transnational/global market integration as a trigger to downgrade social regulation? What is 
the relationship between higher standards and better procedural guarantees? Is there a 
relationship with the latter serving to enhance accountability specifically in relation to the 
former? What is at stake here is the answer to the question whether the EU is apt to extend 
what I term access justice to the outside world either through EU-induced private regulation 
or through private regulation alone though inspired by the European Social Model. 
The contributions provide a mixed account. Again I take the assessments for granted and I 
refrain from questioning or commenting on what the experts in their own fields have found. 
The European regulatory hand is certainly visible in the field of product safety and food 
safety. Here it looks as if all actors involved aim at stretching good European standards 
beyond EU territory. This goes along with Anu Bradford,76 who uses food safety as one field 
in which the Brussels effect unfolds. Similar conclusions could be drawn with regard to the 
defence of fairness in supply chains, the promotion of fair access to energy supply 
platforms77 or attempts to stretch ADR dispute settlement procedures beyond EU territory.78 
However, it would be premature to draw from a few examples general conclusions on the 
kind of justice which is provided – or not. Financial services seem to be an area where the EU 
is precisely playing the role that their forceful critiques are advocating. The EU is liberalizing 
investments via a detour over the international level playing field.79 A counterexample is 
securitization, where the EU is joining forces with IOSCO to set standards not only for the EU 
but maybe beyond the EU.80 Whether these standards are good or bad for the Social is a 
point for discussion.  
EU regulation of technical standards is playing an outstanding role in the literal sense. The 
external reach of the EU model is interesting for three reasons – the EU has managed to 
promote product safety through their integration into the elaboration of technical 
standards. There would not have been a TBT/SPS agreement at the international level 
without the commitment of the EU to product safety regulation and the joining together of 
laws and technical standards.81 The European model has served as an inspiration for the 
                                                          
75 In a personal communication to the author on what remains of European labour law in the UK after Brexit. 
76 A Bradford, (Fn. 2) 
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making of transnational standards, which is true with regard to the procedure and the 
overall institutional framework – co-operation between the legislator and private standard 
bodies. It is open for discussion whether reform of the European regulatory framework as 
proposed by van Gestel/Lochem82 would or could impact the design of standard-setting in 
ISO/IEC and other international standard-setting bodies. Read together with the recent 
judgments of the ECJ, such an external extension might be highly likely. 
A final word – Legitimacy, Reality, Potentiality  
The contributions to this book do not discuss why and under what conditions it might be for 
the EU to tell the rest of the world why they should follow the EU in their better and higher 
standards of consumer protection, environmental protection, health and safety, broader 
participation of civil society in making the rules and increased accountability of those who 
make and enforce standards, codes and contracts. Overall the contributions do not question 
the legitimacy of the EU to extend European regulatory private law beyond its boundaries; 
they simply take it by and large for granted whenever they engage with the particularities of 
the field they are working on. With regard to the inward dimension of European regulatory 
private law, I have argued that the EU is able to generate access justice and societal justice. 
Whether the generation of justice in the EU could legitimate its extension beyond EU 
territory is a question that still awaits an answer. This would require a deeper engagement 
with approaches in the framework of the WTO and the EU that investigate the conditions 
under which the EU’s approach might be legitimated. In international trade law, there is a 
widely recognized difference between whether states and/or supranational institutions 
enforce internationally agreed standards, codes and contracts, or whether they impose their 
own assessment on the rest of the world. The EU is clearly doing more: it is part of the EU’s 
constitutional agenda. This mandate raises much deeper questions on the legitimacy of EU 
action.83 I will leave the discussion on the potential link between WTO law, EU law and ERPL 
for a later stage.  
What remains is a kind of stocktaking, a comparison of the reality vs the potentiality. In the 
light of the most ambitious objectives enshrined in Articles 21 (1), 3(5) and 21 (2) h) TFEU, 
the question remains how deep the gap is between what the EU is supposed to do and its 
actual behaviour. The attractiveness of the EU as a model for the outside world will to a 
large extent depend on whether the EU succeeds in maintaining, if not enlarging, its social 
legacy in a globalized world. Private law and private regulation is not at the forefront of 
political awareness, although it forms the foundation on which the international economic 
order rests. Here formal competences of rule-making matter less than private initiatives and 
whether these are responsibly exercised.  
The contributions demonstrate a rather mixed picture of the current role of the EU, the 
European Commission, European private associations such as CEN and CENELEC as well as of 
the role of EU law and the practical extension of values such as ‘safety and fairness’. Many if 
not most contributions combine the ‘as is’ analysis with how ‘the law should be’. These 
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normative assumptions are guided by the conviction that the EU has something to offer and 
that the EU is in principle able to turn its policy agenda into a more convincing reality. Anu 
Bradford’s Brussels effect might sound like a threat to the USA and maybe to China, if not to 
the Global South. Rather than turned into a slogan for a more social economic order and a 
more just society, the Brussels effect might well be the mission the EU needs to complete, if 
it wants to maintain (?) and/or regain (?) its attractiveness for non-EU Member States and 
for regional economic orders.  
 
 
 
 
